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Abstract
Research shows that ethnic minority candidates often face an electoral penalty at the 
ballot box. In this study, we argue that this penalty depends on both candidate and 
voter characteristics, and that pro-minority policy positions incur a greater penalty 
than a candidate’s ethnic background itself. Using a conjoint experiment embed-
ded in a panel study of British voters, we investigate the relative contributions of 
candidate ethnicity, policy positions, affirmative action, and voter attitudes to this 
electoral penalty. We find that although Pakistani (Muslim) candidates are penalized 
directly for their ethnicity, black Caribbean candidates receive on average the same 
levels of support as white British ones. However, black Caribbean candidates suffer 
conditional discrimination where they are penalized if they express support for pro-
minority policies, and all candidates are penalized for having been selected through 
an affirmative action initiative. We also find that some white British voters are more 
inclined to support a black Caribbean candidate than a white British one, all else 
being equal. These voters (one quarter of our sample) have cosmopolitan views on 
immigration, and a strong commitment to anti-prejudice norms. However, despite 
efforts across parties to increase the ethnic diversity of candidates for office, many 
voters’ preferences continue to pose barriers toward descriptive and substantive rep-
resentation of ethnic minority groups.
Keywords Ethnicity · Muslims · Candidates · Representation · Prejudice · 
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Introduction
Political underrepresentation of ethnic minorities is a significant problem in many 
rich and diverse democratic nations. In Britain, as in Europe and North America, 
ethnic minorities are substantially underrepresented in elected office, relative to 
the general population (Bloemraad 2013). Underrepresentation has important 
negative consequences for minority groups and for societies as a whole. A lack 
of descriptive representation reduces responsiveness to constituents (Costa 2017), 
and also may reduce substantive representation, as minorities’ interests and per-
spectives become more easily overlooked if they are underrepresented in legis-
latures and policy-making processes (Mansbridge 1999). Underrepresentation 
may also create broader problems by signaling identity-based exclusion, thereby 
undermining political integration, engagement, and efficacy (Merolla et al. 2013; 
Street 2014), and increasing political alienation (Pantoja and Segura 2003). Fur-
ther, lack of representation can contribute to mass protest and even riots (Dan-
cygier 2010).
Underrepresentation is clearly a persistent problem, but the causes remain 
uncertain. Some evidence suggests that one cause may be “electoral discrimina-
tion,” i.e., voters’ biases against minority candidates (Portmann and Stojanović 
2018). This study explores this question further, examining the extent and nature 
of biases against minority candidates, using data collected from a representative 
sample of the British electorate. We leverage a new dataset and research design 
that allows us to test not only for direct discrimination, but also for a range of 
subtler forms of opposition both descriptive and substantive representation of 
ethnic minority groups.
Most simply, we examine the possibility of direct categorical discrimination, 
asking whether a candidate’s ethnic minority status leads to reduced electoral 
support. We also examine the possibility of several subtler biases that could pose 
additional barriers to both descriptive and substantive representation of ethnic 
minority population. We ask whether voters directly challenge efforts to enhance 
descriptive representation through affirmative action recruitment of candidates, 
and likewise whether they oppose enhanced substantive representation in the form 
of candidates taking pro-minority positions in two policy areas. Further still, we 
explore the possibility of conditional discrimination: do voters impose additional 
penalties on pro-minority candidates if the candidate herself has a minority group 
identity? Finally, we also address the opposite end of the spectrum of prejudice. 
Here, we ask whether some white British voters are so concerned with opposing 
prejudice that they actually favor minority candidates over similar majority-group 
candidates.
We investigate these questions using a conjoint experimental design, a meth-
odology ideally suited to testing the independent impact of multiple factors on a 
single decision, in this case the choice between two candidates in a hypothetical 
election. We find clear evidence of both direct and conditional electoral discrimi-
nation. Pakistani candidates suffer an electoral penalty on the basis of ethnicity 
alone. In contrast, black Caribbean candidates suffer discrimination if and only if 
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they take pro-minority policy positions—these stances are generally unpopular, 
but are penalized even more when offered by a black Caribbean candidate. On the 
other hand, we also find that some voters are positively motivated by anti-preju-
dice principles to vote for ethnic minority candidates, even in conditions where 
they could opt out of choosing altogether.
Our study makes several key contributions to emerging scholarly literatures. 
First, we provide the most clear-cut evidence to date about the existence and 
degree of discrimination against ethnic minority candidates in Britain. Second, 
we advance beyond studies of direct discrimination by showing how voters’ pref-
erences hinder equal descriptive and substantive representation of minority popu-
lations, even for groups that do not suffer direct electoral discrimination in the 
aggregate. Although our study focuses on a single country, we identify mecha-
nisms of direct and conditional discrimination that may apply more broadly—
minority underrepresentation is a common issue in Western European democra-
cies and electoral discrimination is a poorly understood potential cause. Finally, 
we add to the emerging literature on the increasingly important divide in British 
politics based on a “cosmopolitan-backwater” dimension (Jennings and Stoker 
2016).
Discrimination at the Ballot Box?
Our initial question is, simply, do British voters discriminate against ethnic 
minority candidates at the ballot box? While it would be easy to assume that they 
do, the prior literature is equivocal. Analysis of observational data suggests sub-
stantial levels of discrimination. For example, Fisher et al. (2015) estimate from 
survey data that ethnic minority candidates—especially Muslim candidates—suf-
fered a penalty of about four percentage points among white British voters rela-
tive to white British candidates in the 2010 general election. Stegmaier and col-
leagues (Stegmaier et  al. 2013), using 2010 general election returns, find that 
incumbency advantage increased by two percentage points if the challenger was a 
member of a racial or ethnic minority group. Thrasher et al. (2017) find an advan-
tage for local election “candidates whose surnames suggest a British ethnic ori-
gin,” while those with non-European names had the largest disadvantage.
On the other hand, even careful observational studies are vulnerable to con-
founds, and experimental work finds no evidence of anti-Muslim electoral dis-
crimination. Campbell and Cowley’s (2014) survey experiment randomly var-
ies several characteristics of hypothetical candidates for office. They do not find 
bias against the Muslim candidate; holding other attributes constant, a candidate 
named “Muhammad” fares just as well as “George.” However, reanalysis of their 
experimental data (available from authors upon request) shows heterogeneous 
effects; some Labour partisans actually appear to prefer a Muslim candidate, 
while other groups increase rates of non-response or support for the non-Muslim 
candidate. Lacking more information about the identity and preferences of these 
respondents, we cannot explain these patterns.
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Categorical Discrimination and Barriers to Descriptive Representation
We begin with the most straightforward hypothesis, which we label the Categori-
cal Discrimination Hypothesis. Majority-group voters may be less likely to vote for 
a minority candidate, all else being equal. Several theoretical traditions converge 
on this prediction. Categorical discrimination may reflect taste-based prejudice or 
“antipathy” toward other groups “based on faulty and inflexible generalization” 
(Allport 1954). Outright prejudice—measured as desired social distance from other 
groups—has declined over time in Britain, but remains fairly widespread, particu-
larly toward Muslims, who bear the brunt of negative attitudes from other minority 
groups as well as from the majority ethnic group (Storm et al. 2017). A subtly dif-
ferent explanation is in-group favoritism, where discriminatory behavior stems from 
a preference for one’s own group instead of or alongside prejudice against other 
groups (LeVine and Campbell 1972).
In the context of representation, there might be a third, related, explanation for 
direct discrimination in vote choice: a desire for descriptive representation among 
majority-ethnicity voters. Descriptive representation is usually discussed as hav-
ing value for underrepresented groups such as women and minorities (Mansbridge 
1999), but some evidence shows that members of majority groups have even stronger 
preferences for in-group representatives (Gay 2002). In the US case, a substantial 
proportion of white voters seem to fear the consequences of descriptive representa-
tion of minority groups (Parker and Barreto 2014), whilst some working class white 
Americans and Britons explicitly characterize themselves as minority group mem-
bers and believe that they face discrimination and lack representation (Gest 2016). 
For such individuals, the racial or ethnic identity of their representatives may be 
important symbolically (Tate 2001).
All of these underlying mechanisms lead to one essential result: a decreased like-
lihood of voting for a candidate simply due to their membership in an ethnic minor-
ity category. This discrimination may stem from prejudice, in-group trust and favor-
itism, or beliefs about the value of descriptive representation (in a society in which 
race and ethnicity are salient identities), or some combination thereof, but in our 
context these are observationally equivalent, and therefore can be combined into a 
single hypothesis predicting categorical discrimination, or, again, simply that ethnic 
minority candidates will draw less support than otherwise identical white British 
candidates.
Substantive Representation and Conditional Ethnic Penalties
Although most prior work on electoral discrimination in Britain and elsewhere 
looks for categorical discrimination, voters’ biases and preferences can contribute 
to the underrepresentation of ethnic minority groups in other ways. We suggest that 
ethnic minority candidates may face several forms of conditional discrimination, in 
which voters’ discrimination depends on the candidates’ policy positions or other 
characteristics.
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First, we propose the Substantive Representation Hypothesis: majority-group vot-
ers may oppose the substantive representation of minority interests by any candidate, 
regardless of that candidate’s own ethnicity. White voters might resist substantive rep-
resentation of minority voters’ preferences in line with divergent issue opinions. For 
example, data from the Ethnic Minority British Election Study and the main British 
Election Study show marked differences in support for affirmative action between eth-
nic minority and white British groups: 70% of ethnic minority respondents favored 
improving opportunities for black and Asian people, compared to 20% of white British 
(Heath et al. 2013). On immigration, 50% of minorities opposed sending most asylum 
seekers home immediately, compared to 39% of the white British—not as stark a differ-
ence, but still a significant one. If candidates cannot succeed when promoting policies 
that are preferred by more ethnic minority voters, there may be a deficit of substan-
tive representation regardless of whether minority candidates are elected. The phenom-
enon of symbolic inclusion—where minority candidates are selected primarily for their 
appeal to white voters as a symbol of liberalism and not for their strong ties to minority 
voters and interests—illustrates parties’ awareness of this dilemma (Dancygier 2017, p. 
28).
The Substantive Representation Hypothesis does not entail direct disadvantages for 
ethnic minority candidates. In practice, however, opposition to substantive representa-
tion would likely disadvantage such candidates, as empirically they are more likely to 
seek to represent minority constituents’ substantive interests (Sobolewska et al. 2018). 
For example, ethnic minority MPs are more likely to ask official Parliamentary Ques-
tions about minority rights and about immigration (Saalfeld and Bischof 2013). Thus, 
substantive representation may well go hand in hand with descriptive representation.
In addition, we suggest a potential interaction effect, in which minority candidates 
may pay a larger price at the ballot box for taking pro-minority policy positions than 
white candidates pay for holding the  same view. This possibility—the Conditional 
Ethnic Penalty Hypothesis—draws on a “group-centric” view of voters (e.g., Huddy 
2018). Candidates’ issue views may convey information not only about the policies 
they pursue but also about group loyalties, i.e., whose interests they will tend to rep-
resent if elected. As noted above, white voters often fear minority leaders will prior-
itize minority interests at their expense (Fulton and Gershon 2018). This perception of 
minority candidates is particularly difficult to dispel, even with contrary information 
about candidate ideology (Karl et al. 2016). If minority candidates promise to promote 
minority groups’ interests, white voters may assess a conditional ethnic penalty above 
and beyond what a white candidate would face for taking an unpopular policy position.
Methods/Data
Case Selection: Britain
We test these three major hypotheses, along with several extensions described 
below, in the context of Great Britain, and more specifically in the run up to the 
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2017 general election, which was called three years early and initially centered the 
Brexit divide (Cowley and Kavanagh 2018).
Britain is well-established as a multi-ethnic democracy, with ethnic minorities 
comprising 10% of the electorate and 10% of the House of Commons.1 In common 
with other former European imperial powers, the predominant form of migration to 
post-war Britain originated from colonial ties. The largest ethnic minority groups in 
the 2011 Census were people of Indian, Pakistani, black African, black Caribbean 
and Bangladeshi ethnicity, many of whom were born in the UK (as much as 60%, 
in the case of those identifying as black Caribbean). More recent migration patterns 
have brought large numbers of immigrants from Central and Eastern European EU 
member states; in 2015 the number of Polish-born residents in the UK exceeded the 
Indian-born to become the largest country of origin for British immigrants (Rienzo 
and Vargas-Silva 2018). Adding to the diversity of the electorate, the UK is unusual 
in granting full voting rights to immigrants who are non-citizens if they are citizens 
of a Commonwealth country instead, so many minority groups have high levels of 
eligibility and participation in elections, with the exception of EU immigrants and 
some groups of black Africans without Commonwealth citizenship.
Our study focuses on potential discrimination against candidates of black Carib-
bean and Pakistani ethnicity, both prominent ethnic minority groups with long and 
distinctive histories in Britain, and with high levels of political activity. Initially, 
migrants from the Caribbean were directly recruited by the Ministry of Labour for 
jobs in professions in the healthcare and transport sectors, whilst Pakistani migration 
addressed labour shortages in industries including textiles, engineering and steel. 
Later, family reunification policies meant that migration continued despite curbs on 
labour migration (Messina 2007). War between then East and West Pakistan—now 
Bangladesh and Pakistan—also played a role. In recent years, migration from Paki-
stan has continued—in particular through student migration (Luthra and Platt 2016), 
but that directly from the Caribbean has slowed. Moreover, British Pakistanis are 
predominantly Muslim, and thus more distinct from the majority population on reli-
gious lines. We therefore expect that stereotypes or antipathy towards one of these 
groups may not apply to others.
In particular, we expect Pakistani candidates will receive higher levels of opposi-
tion than other minority groups. This is primarily due to high observed levels of 
Islamophobia (Storm et al. 2017), likely to be directed at this large, salient and over-
whelmingly Muslim ethnic minority group.2 Indeed, the far right in the UK adopted 
Islamophobia as a more acceptable form of ethnocentrism than biological racism 
(Goodwin 2011). Recent survey evidence suggests lower (though still considerable) 
levels of outright prejudice toward black people in Britain than toward Muslims, 
with 44% saying that they would personally mind if a close relative were to marry a 
2 Pakistani ethnicity is especially salient in a British context because a truncated form of the term is a 
racial slur frequently used against people of South Asian ethnicity.
1 65 MPs from ethnic minority backgrounds were elected in the 2019 general election of 650 MPs in 
total, in line with the proportion of ethnic minorities in the electorate. At the time of fieldwork however 
this proportion was only 6% (42).
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person of Muslim origin, compared to 22% who would mind if the person were of 
black or West Indian (an older term for Caribbean) origin (Kelley et al. 2017). Par-
allel research in the United States suggests that specific prejudice against Muslims 
as a group is strongly correlated with ethnocentrism and negative attitudes towards 
other ethnic and racial minorities (Sides and Gross 2013; Kalkan et al. 2009). This 
heightened and specific anti-Muslim hostility is consistent with research on Britain 
suggesting that discrimination, lack of integration, and potential for political con-
flict remain higher with respect to British Muslims than with respect to other minor-
ity groups (Modood 2005). In particular, black Caribbeans as a group enjoy greater 
social integration (Maxwell 2010) and fewer discriminatory attitudes (Ford 2011).
Aside from its status as a multi-ethnic democracy, Britain provides a useful set-
ting for this study for two main reasons: (i) ethnic minority candidates stand for all 
parties (Sobolewska 2013), and (ii) observational evidence suggests electoral dis-
crimination in British elections (Stegmaier et al. 2013; Thrasher et al. 2017; Fisher 
et al. 2015).
Unlike the US, race/ethnicity of political candidates can be disentangled easily 
from party membership. Although the Labour party took the lead in fielding minor-
ity candidates (electing the first post-war ethnic minority MPs in 1987), the number 
of ethnic minority MPs for the Conservative party has increased sharply since 2005, 
especially in safer seats with largely white electorates (Sobolewska 2013). This 
means that many Conservative minority candidates rely strongly on white voters for 
their election. The Labour party also selects more minority candidates in safe seats, 
but these safe seats have higher proportions of ethnic minority electors (Sobolewska 
2013). Notably, this pattern of running minority candidates in safer seats may sug-
gest that both major parties anticipate some electoral discrimination, and select seats 
with lower marginality for minority candidates to minimize the costs of this dis-
crimination as much as possible. This is feasible as central bodies in both parties 
exercise a degree of control over shortlists, especially in the shortened timescale 
of the 2017 general election (Moisi et  al. 2017). However, it also makes it more 
difficult to estimate the impact of electoral discrimination from observational data, 
since those data arise in part from a strategic process of candidate selection which 
itself is affected by beliefs about voter biases. Thus, an experimental test is needed 
to determine whether observational evidence of electoral discrimination is substanti-
ated, and to explore whether any discrimination we find is focused on descriptive or 
substantive representation.
Study Design
Our data come from a conjoint experiment embedded in wave 11 of the British Elec-
tion Study Internet Panel (BESIP) with 7903 respondents (Fieldhouse et al. 2017). 
The fieldwork took place between April 24 and May 3, 2017, before the 2017 gen-
eral election, which was held on June 8 after being called on April 18. The BESIP 
recruits a representative sample of the British population (excludes Northern Ire-
land) from the YouGov online panel, using targeted quota sampling. All respondents 
are eligible to vote in at least one type of election (as determined by citizenship 
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and age). Surveys are completed in a web browser. In wave 11, the experiment was 
fielded to a random subsample of the overall survey.
In the conjoint experiment, respondents were asked to choose between two hypo-
thetical candidates who varied randomly on a series of characteristics, including 
party, ethnicity,3 gender, policy position on migration and refugees, priorities for 
law enforcement, and their route into politics. Each candidate was described in a 
vignette with the following structure, where italicized words inside square brackets 
were varied randomly:
[Name] is a candidate in your area from the [Conservative party/Labour 
party], who comes from a [white British/Pakistani/black Caribbean] back-
ground. [He/She] is in favour of [letting skilled migrants enter the country to 
fill jobs in sectors with skill shortages/accepting more refugees who are fleeing 
war or persecution/strongly limiting migration to the UK]. [He/She] thinks that 
[race equality laws/laws against anti-social behaviour should be more strictly 
enforced, with greater penalties for those found guilty of harassment and dis-
crimination/disturbing the public order].4 [Name] became a candidate after 
[being included on a list of candidates from under-represented backgrounds/
getting involved in the political party].
The two vignettes were presented on the same page. Respondents were then asked 
which candidate they preferred: “Which of these candidates would you rather have 
as your MP?”.
By varying all of the candidate characteristics randomly, the conjoint design 
allows us to estimate the effects of any one of them, independently of the others and 
without bias (Hainmueller et al. 2014). This makes it an ideal tool to test simultane-
ously for the wide array of hypothesized direct and conditional forms of discrimina-
tion. For example, Abrajano et al. (2018) used a conjoint design to study categori-
cal discrimination in the US electoral context, finding substantial effects of ethnic 
(Latino) names on candidate preference. Table 1 below summarizes the experimen-
tal design, highlighting hypothesized sources of minority candidate disadvantage.
First, varying ethnicity allows us to test for categorical discrimination. Note that 
we vary the candidates’ names to accompany the ethnicity (and candidate gender) 
manipulations, as naming traditions vary across ethnic groups. White British can-
didates were named Oliver and Emily, Pakistani candidates were named Omar and 
4 The wording within this set of brackets represents one randomly-assigned variable, even though there 
are two sets of italicized words. The “race equality” treatment used “race equality laws” and “harass-
ment and discrimination;” the “anti-social behaviour” condition used “laws against anti-social behavior” 
with “disturbing the public order.”.
3 Readers unfamiliar with UK might find it helpful to know that White British is a category for ethnicity 
in the UK Census, alongside Caribbean and Pakistani. Pakistani as a category falls under Asian/Asian 
British, and Caribbean falls under the broader category Black/Black British. This terminology is com-
monplace, and we believe that participants in the UK would not think that a candidate from a Pakistani 
or black Caribbean background lacked citizenship or residence rights. White British is often used to draw 
a difference between white people who are native to the UK, those who are immigrants from other Euro-
pean countries, who the Census classifies as White Other, white people who are from Ireland, who the 
Census classifies as White Irish, and white people who are from a Gypsy or Irish Traveller background.
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Fatima, and black Caribbean candidates were named Joshua and Gabrielle. In addi-
tion, in case a given respondent was randomly assigned two candidates of the same 
ethnicity and gender, we assigned the second name from an alternate list that also 
are common for each ethnicity/gender combination: George, Sarah, Mohammad, 
Maryam, Daniel, and Kim.
Next, to test the Substantive Representation Hypothesis, we vary candidates’ 
policy positions. The design allows us to look for the effects of policy positions 
independent of candidate ethnicity to test the Substantive Representation Hypoth-
esis. We include two policy areas, immigration and anti-discrimination law, which 
are contentious differences in issue positions between majority and minority group 
members in Britain in recent years. Immigration in particular has been a highly sali-
ent policy issue in Britain since the early 2000s (Blinder and Richards 2019) and 
was central in the political dissatisfaction that lead to the Brexit vote (Evans and 
Menon 2017), while anti-discrimination law is a much stronger policy priority for 
ethnic minorities than white British voters (Heath et al. 2013).
The inclusion of these issues also allows us to test for the conditional discrimina-
tion predicted by the Conditional Ethnic Penalty Hypothesis. We estimate interac-
tion effects between candidate ethnicity and policy positions to test for this possibil-
ity. The conjoint design also permits a number of additional possibilities, discussed 
further below.
Analysis and Population of Interest
The data were unstacked following Hainmueller et al. (2014), so that each row corre-
sponds to one candidate, their characteristics, and whether the respondent said they 
would vote for them or not. Each row in the data set is a candidate + characteristics 
combination, and the model is of the effect of these characteristics on their selection, 
Table 1  Conjoint design, with hypotheses
Boldface shows factors with hypothesized negative impact on candidate vote share. Boldface underlined 
indicates that we expect Pakistani candidates to have a stronger electoral penalty than black Caribbean 
candidates
Candidate attribute Options Hypothesized interactions
Ethnicity White British
Black Caribbean
Pakistani
Minority × IMCP
Minority × neither option
Entry into politics List of underrepresented OR 
became involved in party
List of underrepresented ×  minority
Immigration policy Skilled immigration
Refugee
Strictly limit
Skilled immigration × minority
Pro-refugee × minority
Law enforcement Enforce race equality law OR
anti-social behavior law
Pro-equality × minority
Gender Male/female Female × minority
Party Labour/Conservative Conservative candidate × minority
Conservative voter × minority
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independent of their opponent. Thus, each participant provided two cases—the 
choice to vote or not vote for each of the two candidates presented to them in the set 
of vignettes. This means that the 7,903 participants in the study provide double that 
number of cases for analysis (n = 15,806).
We use logistic regression to estimate the Average Marginal Component Effect 
(AMCE) for each of the candidate attributes varied in the design. We also estimate 
interaction effects between multiple candidate attributes (Average Component Inter-
action Effects, or ACIE) and between attributes and respondent characteristics (con-
ditional AMCE, where AMCE is conditional on the value of a given respondent 
characteristic).
Since our population of interest is the British electorate, we analyze the results 
from all respondents, rather than selecting only white British respondents. This is 
more comparable with studies relying on election returns, and acknowledges that 
black Caribbean or Pakistani candidates might face prejudice from voters with other 
ethnic minority or white non-British backgrounds. Where appropriate we conduct 
a robustness check of limiting the analysis to those identified as white British; this 
is used to distinguish support for minority candidates from non-minority voters due 
to commitment to anti-prejudice norms, and support for co-ethnic candidates by 
minority voters.
Results5
We begin by examining the main effects of candidate attributes on vote choice. We 
find, first of all, that support for the Categorical Discrimination Hypothesis depends 
on candidate ethnicity. We find clear evidence of categorical discrimination against 
the hypothetical Pakistani candidate, as we can see by examining the top three rows 
of Fig.  1. These rows show the marginal effect of Pakistani and black Caribbean 
candidate ethnicity relative to a white British candidate baseline. Lines indicate 95% 
confidence intervals around these estimated effects. The AMCE of Pakistani ethnic-
ity is -0.06 (p < 0.001), for an estimated six percentage point disadvantage, relative 
to the white British candidate.
On the other hand, we do not find evidence of categorical discrimination against 
the black Caribbean candidate, with an AMCE that is indistinguishable from zero 
(b = − 0.003, p = 0.74). As we will show below, black Caribbean candidates suffer 
subtler forms of discrimination, but our results do not show a straightforward eth-
nic penalty. Thus, our results are consistent with previous observational evidence 
that only Muslim candidates suffered an ethnic penalty in the 2010 general election 
(Fisher et al. 2015), and with work on the particular potency of Islamophobia, over 
and above general ethnocentrism, in British political and social attitudes (Storm 
et al. 2017).
5 We focus on presenting the most important results in the text and/or visual form. Full tables can be 
found in the Supplementary Information.
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Meanwhile, we find strong support for the Substantive Representation Hypoth-
esis. Candidates were penalized for taking positions on both law enforcement and 
migration policy that could be seen as providing substantive representation of 
minority groups’ interests or policy preferences. Candidates who prioritized enforc-
ing anti-social behavior laws were more popular than the pro-minority position of 
prioritizing enforcement of racial equality laws. This is seen in the positive effect of 
“anti-social behavior” relative to the “race equality laws” baseline under the heading 
“Policy”.
Voters also strongly penalized candidates who took the most liberal position on 
immigration policy, which was offering to accept more refugees fleeing war or per-
secution. This effect was the largest in magnitude of any candidate characteristic in 
the experiment, as can be seen by comparing marginal effect sizes in Fig.  1. The 
fourteen percentage point penalty (relative to the moderate immigration position) 
far outdistanced the largest penalties for candidate ethnicity (six points), affirma-
tive action background (three points), and advocacy for enforcing race equality laws 
(seven points). Note that these were average effects for candidates of all three ethnic 
groups tested, including white British.
Since ethnic minorities in Britain are more supportive of immigration and refu-
gees, this result exemplifies the difficulty of substantive representation for minority 
group interests in a majoritarian system. It is important to note, however, that the 
immigration policy position associated with the greatest electoral performance was 
not the most anti-immigration position. Rather, support for skilled immigration in 
shortage sectors outperformed the most restrictive option, which was “strongly lim-
iting migration to the UK.”
white British
Pakistani
black Caribbean
Male
Female
Getting involved
List of underrepresented candidates
Skilled immigration
Refugees
Strictly limited
Anti-social behaviour
Race equality laws
Conservatives
Labour
Forced choice
'Neither' option present
Demographics
Immigration Policy
Policy
Party
Neither option present
-.2 -.15 -.1 -.05 0
Average marginal effects
Fig. 1  Main effects of candidate characteristics on vote choice
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The size of the effects for immigration policy compared to candidate ethnicity 
and other characteristics underlines the salience of immigration to candidate and 
party choice at the time of the 2017 election. It may be somewhat reassuring that 
policy positions have a stronger effect on hypothetical vote choice than candidate 
ethnicity when separated by experimental control. However, as we shall see below, 
the importance of policy positions is not entirely good news for minority candidates’ 
electoral prospects.
Conditional Ethnic Penalties: Black Caribbean Candidates Punished 
for Pro‑minority Positions
As discussed above, discrimination at the ballot box may be subtler than simple cat-
egorical discrimination. We examine the effects of interactions between candidate 
ethnicity and other candidate attributes, by estimating a logistic regression model 
that included all candidate attributes, plus interactions between ethnicity and each of 
the other candidate attributes. This allows us to test our Conditional Ethnic Penalty 
Hypothesis.
The results support the hypothesis: ethnic minority candidates are in fact penal-
ized more than white candidates for offering substantive representation of minor-
ity group interests. Voters punished all candidates who took these positions, but the 
penalties tended to be larger for ethnic minority candidates. In the case of immigra-
tion policy, black Caribbean candidates supporting more generosity toward refugees 
rather than a policy of skilled immigration suffered an eighteen point penalty, com-
pared to twelve for white British and thirteen for Pakistani candidates, as illustrated 
in Fig. 2. Here, the conditional ethnic penalty seemed focused on black Caribbean 
candidates, although it is important to keep in mind that Pakistani candidates begin 
from a lower baseline of support, so this difference may simply even things out 
between these groups.
Meanwhile, voters punished both ethnic minority candidates more than they pun-
ished the white British candidate for supporting greater enforcement of race equality 
laws. The coefficient on the interaction term for Pakistani candidates is only signifi-
cant at the 10% level (p = 0.09), but it is very similar to that for the black Caribbean 
candidate, implying a seven point penalty for Pakistani candidates and a similar 
eight point penalty for black Caribbean candidates if they support greater enforce-
ment of racial equality laws, compared with just a four point penalty for a similar 
white British candidate.
Taken together, then, our main results support all three hypotheses about elec-
toral discrimination. We found evidence of categorical discrimination, although only 
against Pakistani candidates. However, we found that voters penalized substantive 
representation of pro-minority positions in all candidates, confirming the Substan-
tive Representation Hypothesis. Further, we found Conditional Ethnic Penalties 
against black Caribbean candidates in both policy areas, and against Pakistani can-
didates in the case of policy towards anti-discrimination law enforcement. These dif-
ferences vary in substantive size, but some are quite large, and all of them are sig-
nificant enough to make a difference in a close election.
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Extensions
In addition to our main hypotheses, our conjoint design allows us to test a number 
of additional hypotheses. These are fourfold; (i) opposition to positive action recruit-
ment practices, particularly when used to increase descriptive representation of eth-
nic minority groups, (ii) further conditional ethnic penalties according to gender and 
party, (iii) differential responses to candidate ethnicity depending on political and 
normative commitments, and (iv) greater support for minority candidates among 
minority voters.
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Attitudes to Affirmative Action
Affirmative action, implemented in the construction of shortlists for potential candi-
dates, is a key means toward increasing descriptive representation in Britain. In fact, 
because local party members play a significant role in candidate selection, the main 
policy lever for national parties in these efforts is their control over the shortlists 
from which local party members select candidates for office. For example, Labour 
instituted All Women Shortlists to this effect, whilst the Conservative party used the 
non-binding but still reasonably effective “A-list” of preferred candidates to increase 
gender balance, ethnic diversity and widen the range of backgrounds represented by 
Conservative parliamentary candidates (Dommett 2015). However, although these 
methods generated more diverse sets of candidates, little is known about voters’ 
reactions to them. To address this, we varied whether the candidate was described as 
‘being included on a list of candidates from under-represented backgrounds’, or the 
more neutral-sounding ‘getting involved in the political party’. Returning to Fig. 1, 
we can see that participants penalized direct efforts at descriptive representation of 
underrepresented groups, beyond the impact of categorical discrimination; candi-
dates who had “got involved” were 4 points more preferred than ones who had ben-
efitted from positive action. This suggests an aversion to existing efforts to achieve 
descriptive representation.
Further Conditional Ethnic Penalties
We also vary gender and party affiliation of candidates to test for conditional dis-
crimination along these dimensions—in particular conditional ethnic penalties for 
ethnic minority women (Crenshaw 1989), and ethnic minority candidates from the 
Conservative party (Besco 2018). Table 1 above summarizes the variation included 
in the conjoint design.
Contrary to our expectations, we did not find evidence for conditional ethnic 
penalties for non-policy candidate characteristics. Notably, there was no significant 
conditional ethnic penalty for candidates who became involved through affirmative 
action recruitment. There were trends in that direction, particularly for black Carib-
bean candidates, but effects were not statistically significant (b = − 0.11, p = 0.19). 
We also did not find evidence for a double penalty for female minority candidates, 
as there was no significant interaction between ethnicity and gender.
A different potential conditional ethnic penalty is the role of political party. As 
noted above, ethnic minority candidates regularly stand for election in both the 
Labour and Conservative parties. Figure  3 plots the marginal effects of candidate 
ethnicity interacted first with candidate party, and secondly, respondent’s vote inten-
tion. Candidate party does not matter; minority candidates faced no additional pen-
alty as a result of standing for the Conservative party. The voter’s party, by contrast, 
does matter. The penalty for Pakistani candidates (compared to white British ones) 
is reduced from nine percentage points among Conservative voters to three points 
among Labour voters. There is also a small penalty of three points for black Carib-
bean candidates among Conservative voters (against white British candidates). This 
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implies that the party of ethnic minority candidates is important solely because of 
the relative levels of prejudice—or, as we will see below, relative support for anti-
prejudice norms—among voters for different parties. Simply put, minority candi-
dates are likely to fare better as Labour candidates because Labour voters are less 
likely to discriminate, not because there is a particular opposition to minority candi-
dates who run as Conservatives.
Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice
In another extension of the main study, we explored the extent to which voters moti-
vated by anti-racist social norms might, in some circumstances, actually prefer an 
ethnic minority candidate to an otherwise similar majority ethnic candidate. To this 
end, after the vote choice question, respondents were asked two items from a scale 
to measure their Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice, validated previously in 
the European context (Blinder et al. 2013; Ivarsflaten et al. 2010). Respondents were 
asked how much they agree or disagree with the following statements; “I attempt to 
act in non-prejudiced ways towards immigrants because it is personally important 
to me,” and “I aim to be non-prejudiced towards immigrants due to my own con-
victions.” Response options were on a five point Likert scale, with a “don’t know” 
option. These questions were asked subsequently so that respondents would not be 
primed to think about social norms against prejudice while making their choices in 
the candidate experiment.
To test whether Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice (IMCP) moderates 
the effect of candidate ethnicity, we calculated the marginal effects from a logistic 
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regression model where candidate ethnicity is interacted with respondents’ IMCP 
score, displayed in Fig. 4. We control for a number of other relevant attitudes6 to try 
to avoid concerns that this only identifies ethnocentrism or a lack of prejudice itself. 
Our expectations are confirmed; respondents with low levels of IMCP are the most 
likely to vote for white British candidates. Conversely, for both black Caribbean and 
Pakistani candidates, it is individuals with higher levels of IMCP—that is, a greater 
commitment to anti-prejudice norms—who are most likely to vote for them.
Furthermore, looking only at respondents in the top quartile of IMCP, we find 
support for the idea that some British voters are positively motivated to vote for 
ethnic minority candidates, all else equal. Among this top quartile, we find a posi-
tive effect of black Caribbean candidate ethnicity on candidate choice and a posi-
tive trend but no statistically significant impact of Pakistani candidate ethnicity. For 
black Caribbean candidates the marginal effect is a boost of eight points (compared 
to white British candidates); for Pakistani candidates the difference is four points. 
This result is robust to removing ethnic minority voters from the sample, eliminat-
ing the possibility that positive voting for minority candidates only occurs among 
minority voters.
To alleviate concerns that these results may have been affected by the position-
ing of our IMCP items after the conjoint experiment in which our dependent vari-
able was measured (Montgomery et al. 2018), we replicated these results using an 
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6 These are the extent to which respondents think that (a) immigrants undermine the welfare state, (b) 
immigration is bad for the economy, (c) immigration undermines cultural life, (d) the level of immigra-
tion should be reduced, (e) feeling thermometer scores towards blacks and Asians, and (f) respondent 
ethnicity.
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alternative moderating variable with similar properties. BESIP respondents were 
also asked in the same wave but before this experiment if they think that “immigra-
tion undermines or enriches Britain’s cultural life.” Respondents at the high end of 
this scale place a positive value on diversity of national and cultural backgrounds, 
similar to those on the high end of the IMCP scale. Indeed, the immigration item 
may tap even more directly into the emerging values divide along the cosmopoli-
tanism dimension (Jennings and Stoker 2016). Among white British respondents 
who agreed most strongly that immigration enriches our cultural life, we find similar 
results to the top quartile of the IMCP scale: a statistically significant positive coeffi-
cient for black Caribbean candidate ethnicity (5 point advantage), and a positive but 
not statistically significant coefficient for Pakistani candidate ethnicity (4 points). 
This echoes the analysis of Kalkan et al. (2018), who find in a vignette experiment 
that Americans with positive views of cultural outgroups are more likely to support 
a Muslim candidate than a baseline candidate of non-specified religion or ethnicity.
We also sought to ensure that these results were not simply an artifact of social 
desirability bias. Perhaps high IMCP individuals are not truly motivated to see 
improved representation of ethnic minorities, but rather are expressing views that 
they believe conform to normative standards of the broader society (or of the sur-
vey researchers). Fortunately, earlier waves of the BESIP included the Brief Social 
Desirability Scale (BSDS) a widely-used and validated measure of social desirabil-
ity bias (Haghighat 2007). Due to attrition, this measure is non-missing for 51% of 
our participants. First, we use this measure to confirm the distinction between IMCP 
and social desirability. We find a small positive correlation between IMCP and 
BSDS (r = 0.10). Second, we repeat the logistic regression analysis controlling for 
the interaction between BSDS scores and candidate ethnicity, and find that it does 
not change the result that higher IMCP predicts greater support for minority can-
didates, and lower for white British candidates. These results confirm that findings 
for IMCP are not a mere artifact of social desirability response bias, in accord with 
prior validation studies (Ivarsflaten et al. 2010; Plant and Devine 1998).
Electoral Support for Ethnic Minority Candidates Among Minority Voters
Given the large sample size of this experiment, it is also possible investigate whether 
ethnic minority participants preferred ethnic minority candidates. The observational lit-
erature on the UK suggests that this occurs only among Pakistani voters, but finds little 
evidence for other ethnic groups (Fisher et al. 2015; Martin 2015). To test whether eth-
nic minority voters prefer minority candidates, we conduct two analyses. Firstly, we test 
whether any ethnic minority candidate (i.e., black Caribbean and Pakistani) is preferred 
compared to a candidate identified as white British among all ethnic minority voters. 
We find that among the 720 observations from 360 respondents who belong to an eth-
nic minority group, any ethnic minority candidate has a 5 point advantage over a white 
British candidate, but this difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.14). Secondly, 
we test the effects of candidate ethnicity among (i) respondents who are one of Paki-
stani or Bangladeshi ethnicity, or report that they are Muslim, and (ii) black Caribbean, 
black African or mixed black ethnicity, in order to identify any co-ethnic preference. 
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Among the 136 observations from 68 respondents who are Pakistani, Bangladeshi and/
or Muslim, the Pakistani candidate has a 14 point advantage over a white British candi-
date, and the black Caribbean candidate a 9 point advantage. Meanwhile, black voters 
give a 16 point advantage to a black Caribbean candidate relative to the white Brit-
ish one, and a 4 point penalty to the Pakistani candidate. However, we are cautious to 
draw too many conclusions from this result as this is based on 166 observations from 
83 respondents. Although the coefficient for black Caribbean candidate ethnicity is sig-
nificantly different from the Pakistani coefficient, neither of these coefficients are sig-
nificantly different from the white British coefficient (p = 0.64 for Pakistani candidate 
ethnicity and 0.09 for black Caribbean). Moreover, research has shown the unsuitability 
of this particular online panel for research on minority voter preferences (Martin 2019).
The ‘Neither’ Experiment
In addition to the main conjoint design, we added an additional experiment within 
the vote choice question. The response options on this question were randomly varied 
to include or not include an explicit option to choose ‘neither’ candidate. This tested 
whether forcing a choice between candidates produces more prejudiced responses. If 
true, this would explain the null finding of voter prejudice against a Muslim candi-
date in the experiment by Campbell and Cowley (2014) which did include a ‘neither’ 
option, thus reconciling the inconsistencies between experimental and observational 
studies in the prior literature.
Contrary to our expectations however, the neither option made only a small and sta-
tistically non-significant difference in the likelihood that respondents selected an ethnic 
minority candidate. In the forced choice condition, 35% chose a white British candi-
date, while 30% chose a Pakistani candidate. With the neither option, these percentages 
change to 22% and 18%, respectively. Respondents were also no more likely to select 
neither candidate when faced with an ethnic minority candidate. Therefore, we have not 
been able to resolve the paradox in the UK literature between Campbell and Cowley’s 
(2014) experimental null finding and observational studies of ethnic penalties (Steg-
maier et al. 2013; Fisher et al. 2015; Thrasher et al. 2017).
Discussion
We have shown that electoral discrimination by British voters poses several dis-
tinct obstacles to the election of ethnic minority candidates, and therefore to rec-
tifying the problem of underrepresentation. Electoral discrimination is a disad-
vantage in and of itself, and also may provide an incentive for strategic elites to 
act as gatekeepers against rising minority candidates rather than making positive 
efforts to recruit them (Dancygier et  al. 2015). Ethnic minority candidates face 
several distinct types of penalties at the ballot box, especially if they seek to rep-
resent minority group interests substantively.
Our results suggest barriers to both descriptive and substantive representa-
tion, with different emphases for the two different groups included in our study as 
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candidates. In the aggregate, categorical discrimination reduced support for hypo-
thetical Pakistani candidates but not for black Caribbean candidates. Future work 
might explore responses to candidates from other ethnic and religious minority 
groups, in Britain and in other European countries as well, to see whether cat-
egorical discrimination is the exception or the rule, and whether it is systemati-
cally more likely for Muslim minorities than for Europe’s other minority groups.
A second finding suggests an additional barrier to descriptive representation: 
heightened opposition to candidates who were recruited through affirmative 
action efforts to identify candidates from underrepresented backgrounds. This 
finding was race-blind in the experimental context, as voters applied this pref-
erence even to white British candidates. Nonetheless, in practice this pattern of 
voter preferences still poses an obstacle to increasing descriptive representation. 
In the context of actual candidate recruitment by Britain’s largest parties, it is of 
course women (through the Labour party’s all-women shortlists) and/or minori-
ties (through the candidate A-list used by the Conservative party) who benefit 
from these forms of affirmative action (Dommett 2015). Further, voters might use 
ethnicity as a cue to make faulty inferences about candidates’ backgrounds, as 
they do about policy positions (Karl et al. 2016). Minority candidates may suffer 
electoral discrimination because of assumed affirmative action, even if they did 
not personally benefit from it.
We also found two distinct obstacles to substantive representation of minority 
voters’ preferences and interests. First, we found support for the Substantive Rep-
resentation Hypothesis: voters directly penalized the substantive representation 
of refugees’ and racial minorities’ interests. Candidates who supported the most 
pro-minority positions on both immigration/refugee admissions and enforcement 
of race equality law were disadvantaged in our hypothetical election results.
Second, minority candidates—especially those identified as black Caribbean—
suffered a conditional ethnic penalty. Candidates who took substantive pro-minor-
ity policy positions were penalized more if they were identified as black Carib-
bean than if they were white British. This represents a Catch-22 for many black 
British voters: the co-ethnic candidates who are most likely to represent their 
policy views (and who also provide the advantages of descriptive representation) 
are less likely to win an election while holding those views. Conditional ethnic 
penalties also have implications for elite gate-keepers, heightening the incentive 
to avoid recruiting minority candidates who will represent minority constituents’ 
substantive preferences and interests, while perhaps providing more of an open-
ing to conservative minority candidates (Dancygier 2017).
The results have further implications for understanding the relative positions of 
Europe’s Muslim minorities in comparison with other domestic minority groups. In 
the British case, Pakistani (Muslim) candidates face outright electoral discrimina-
tion in ways that black Caribbean candidates do not. This is consistent with emerg-
ing research suggesting that discrimination, lack of integration, and potential for 
political conflict remain higher with respect to Muslims than for other minority 
groups across Western Europe (Storm et al. 2017).
Of course, even without categorical discrimination, black Caribbean candidates 
still face significant roadblocks. Experimental results indicate that black candidates 
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must take significant steps to distance themselves from real or perceived implica-
tions of their ethnic identities in order to be treated equally by British voters. In our 
controlled, hypothetical context, black Caribbean candidates could evade negative 
effects of discrimination on their vote share, but only by refraining from pro-minor-
ity policy positions on immigration and law enforcement, and avoiding assumptions 
that they benefitted from affirmative action. In real elections, this is much more dif-
ficult. In real campaigns, voters, often ill-informed about policy matters, may draw 
the sorts of inferences about black candidates’ ideological and policy positions that 
have been shown to harm minority candidates’ chances in US studies. And rejecting 
substantive pro-minority policies could reduce support from ethnic minority voters 
and even among the most anti-racist white voters. Nonetheless, these barriers appear 
more permeable than the categorical discrimination facing Pakistani candidates.
Generalizability
The principal threat to the generalizability of our results is that they come from an 
artificial survey experiment environment. This is a limitation of any study of this 
type; however, in this case we are reassured that our results concur with the observa-
tional evidence on ethnic penalties in British elections. But beyond basic questions 
of external validity, we are also interested in exploring how these results might be 
applicable—or at least testable—in other national contexts. We expect our results 
regarding electoral discrimination to be especially relevant in contexts where indi-
vidual candidates are important—i.e., elections run under single member district 
plurality rules or proportional representation systems with explicit voting for or 
against candidates. Indeed, we have noted parallels between our results and studies 
of anti-Muslim sentiment and political behavior in the US.
However, we also note that the broader questions surrounding the policy rep-
resentation of minorities and affirmative action can be highly salient issues in 
elections regardless of the electoral system. The UK’s situation in this regard as 
a multi-ethnic European democracy where ethnic diversity and immigration are 
highly salient and politicized debates is far from unique, and increasingly Euro-
pean elections are defined by issues of immigration and multiculturalism. Our 
results support and extend the literature regarding the on-going reorientation of 
British and European politics around a cosmopolitan-communitarian dimension 
(Hooghe and Marks 2018), also identified by Jennings and Stoker (2016) as the 
“cosmopolitan-backwater” geographical values divide, and connected to the poli-
tics of the “left behind” or “losers of globalization” (Kriesi et al. 2012).
Pro‑minority Voting and the Values Divide
Despite finding significant levels of ongoing discrimination, our study uncovers 
some positive signs for supporters of racial and ethnic equality. First, only a small 
percentage of voters applied these categorical and conditional ethnic penalties 
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in their hypothetical voting decisions. Policy variables had substantially larger 
effects than candidate ethnicity did. This is perhaps cold comfort, since even a 
small shift in votes can be decisive in a competitive election, and any real or per-
ceived disadvantage faced by minority candidates can be magnified through influ-
ence on party elites’ gatekeeping at the candidate recruitment stage.
More importantly, we also find evidence of a positive motivation among some 
white British people to act in a pro-minority manner. Voters with high levels of 
IMCP (the top quartile) provide a small advantage to minority candidates, sug-
gesting a positive value for descriptive representation or diversity. At the same 
time, for voters at the other end of this spectrum or even in the middle, minority 
ethnicity is still a disadvantage. In fact, the aggregate non-effect for black Carib-
bean candidates gives a misleading picture of neutrality: in truth, black candi-
dates were disadvantaged among voters at lower ends of the IMCP spectrum and 
at a slight advantage among those at the higher end.
Scholars have used the cosmopolitan-communitarian divide to understand 
Europeans’ views of immigration (Van Der Brug and Van Spanje 2009), EU inte-
gration (Hooghe and Marks 2018), and Brexit (Hobolt 2018). We would simply 
add that analagous disputes over the value of diversity and racial/ethnic equality 
have broader implications for domestic electoral politics and political integration. 
British voters are divided on whether descriptive and substantive representation 
of ethnic minority populations is a positive goal to be pursued, an outcome to be 
avoided, or an irrelevant consideration. Further, by linking the issue of under-
representation and electoral discrimination to the broader values divide literature, 
we reframe the issue of minority representation in a subtle but important way: 
broadening support for descriptive and substantive representation  of minorities 
depends not only on reducing prejudice, but also on generating affirmative sup-
port for diversity and anti-prejudice as positive values.
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